IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-1875

WADE H. LITTRELL,
Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING FOR PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

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To the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

STATEMENT

Your Petitioner states that his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was denied on October 4, 1976 and that for the purpose of this Petition for Rehearing there is incorporated by reference the Jurisdictional Statement and the Statement of the Case in the previously denied Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR RECONSIDERATION

Count I

1) Whether the Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict on Count I on the Basis That the Uncontradicted Evidence Showed That Appellant Did Not in Fact Make a Return to the Internal Revenue Service of His 1969 Income, Therefore, Could Not Have Violated Title 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).

The Petitioner's position is that through inadvertance he did not mail his executed Form 1040 for 1969 to the Internal Revenue Service and being unaware of this fact until his trial could not and did not authorize anyone to act on his behalf.

The preparer of the Form 1040 Herbert Graham CPA testified that his files relating to Petitioner contained a filing instruction document which bore the notation and initials of his secretary which indicated that she had mailed the Form 1040 for 1969 to Internal Revenue Service. Mr. Graham testified that it is not the custom or practice of certified public accountants to file returns for their clients due to the potential liability involved.

The whole case of the Government is that Special Agent Glen Noeltner testified that Petitioner told him in 1971 that he, the Petitioner, had mailed the Form 1040 from St. Louis, Missouri to the Internal Revenue Service Center. When Special Agent Glen Noeltner so testified he knew or should have known that the statement allegedly made by Petitioner was incorrect for it was learned after the trial that Special Agent Noeltner had photocopied the file of Mr. Graham relating to Petitioner in 1971 and that the file contained the instruction for filing document which bore the notation of the secretary of Mr. Graham to the effect that she had mailed the Form 1040 on June 15, 1970.

The document in question was submitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit after oral argument.

In summary, it is suggested that the Petitioner did not make a return of his 1969 income to the Internal Revenue Service in 1970 and being unaware of such fact did not authorize or ratify the mailing of the Form 1040 to the Internal Revenue Service by the secretary of Mr. Graham and thus an essential element necessary to constitute a violation of Title 26 U.S.C. Section 7206 (1) was missing.

2) Whether the Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for a Directed Verdict on Count I in That of the Amounts Received From the Corporations Which Were the Source of Appellant's Alleged Commissions, Payments Were Made Which Were Described in the Testimony of Internal Revenue Agent Hal Jackson as Payments Made to Employees of Said Corporations for Corporate Purposes and for Corporate Expenses and That Such Payments Exceeded in Amount the Alleged Omitted Commissions From Said Corporations.

The Government's whole case is that Petitioner received $117,500.00 from three corporations in 1969 which he allegedly termed "Commissions" but only reported $60,000.00 on Schedule "C" of the Form 1040 for 1969. The Petitioner testified and introduced in evidence documentary evidence that of the above described funds received from the corporations, he at the direction of the President of the corporations, used in excess of $60,000.00 of such funds to pay corporate expenses. The Government's witness Internal Revenue Agent Hal Jackson testified that the Petitioner had in fact used in excess of $60,000.00 of such funds to pay corporate expenses. Irrespective of whether the funds were or are described by Petitioner or the Government as commissions, gross income or receipts, the substance of the transaction controls, not the form the transaction is cast in or termed.

In the absence of any evidence that the use of the funds to pay corporate expenses were in the nature of loans to the corporations or capital contributions to the corporations, there was no evidence on which the jury could validly conclude that the funds in their entirety were income to the Petitioner.

Count II

1) Whether it Was Plain Error to Conclude that the Subscribing to Internal Revenue Service Form 433-AB Constituted a Violation of Title 26 U.S.C. Section 7206 (1).

This issue is raised for the first time in this Petition. Petitioner requests the Court to consider under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure whether the conviction of Petitioner for a violation of Title 26 U.S.C. Section 7206 (1) on basis of the Petitioner subscribing to Internal Revenue Service Form 433-AB was plain error for the reason that the Internal Revenue Officer did not have the authority to require Petitioner to respond to said Form 433-AB and that said Form 433-AB was not a document or statement required by the Internal Revenue Code or by any regulation lawfully promulgated for enforcement of the Code. *United States v. Levy*, 533 F 2nd 969.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, Petitioner prays that the Supreme Court of the United States grant his heretofore filed Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorney for Petitioner

Certification

I certify that this Petition for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not for delay.

Edward R. Joyce
Attorney for Petitioner

Nos. 75-1875 and 75-1919

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY IN OPPOSITION IN NO. 75-1919 AND SUGGESTING MOOTNESS IN NO. 75-1875

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In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 75-1875

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

No. 75-1919

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

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OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A, pp. i-xv)[1] is reported at 534 F. 2d 150.

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[1]All "Pet. App." references are to the appendices to the petition in No. 75-1875.

JURISDICTION

The judgments of the court of appeals were entered on March 29, 1976.[2] The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 75-1875 was filed on June 26, 1976. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 75-1919 was filed out of time. The time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari was not extended and therefore expired on June 27, 1976. The petition was filed on June 29, 1976. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over that case. See *Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co.*, 261 U.S. 399, 417-418.

STATEMENT

The Clean Air Act, 77 Stat. 392, as amended, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp. V) 1857 *et seq.*, requires the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards that will protect the public from known or anticipated adverse effects of various air pollutants. Each State is primarily responsible for assuring the quality of the air within its territory and must devise an implementation plan designed, at a minimum, to implement, maintain and enforce the national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards.

Under Section 110(a)(2) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(2), the Administrator is required to approve a state implementation plan if he determines, *inter alia*, that "it includes emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and

[2]A copy of the judgments of the court of appeals are attached hereto as Exhibit B.

maintenance of such primary or secondary standard, including, but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls * * *" (Section 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(2)(B)). However, if a State submits a plan that does not provide for the attainment of any national ambient air quality standard, Section 110(c)(1)(B) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1857c-5(c)(1)(B), requires that the Administrator promulgate adquate substitute regulations.

Because the State of California failed to submit those portions of its implementation plan imposing transportation controls to the Environmental Protection Agency by the April 15, 1973 deadline,[3] the Administrator disapproved that aspect of the state plan. 38 Fed. Reg. 16550, 16556, 16564. On October 30, 1973, after public hearings, the Administrator promulgated substitute regulations to control emissions from mobile sources of air pollution in five of the State's air quality control regions. 38 Fed. Reg. 31232 *et seq.*

The Administrator concluded that even if all other reasonable stationary source and mobile source emission reduction measures were imposed, the primary ambient air quality standard for photochemical oxidants would not be satisfied in these five regions by May 31, 1977,

[3]The Clean Air Act required each State to submit an implementation plan to EPA by January 30, 1972; the Administrator was required to approve or disapprove a state plan within four months of its submission. 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(a)(2). The Administrator later granted any State which was required to impose transportation and land-use controls until February 15, 1973, to submit those portions of its plan. 36 Fed. Reg. 15486; 37 Fed. Reg. 10844. In *Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.* v. *Environmental Protection Agency*, 475 F. 2d 968, 970 (C.A.D.C.), the court held that the Act did not authorize this extension and gave the States until April 15, 1973, to submit the deferred portions of their plans.

the latest date to which he was authorized to extend California's attainment deadline under Section 110(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5(e). 38 Fed. Reg. 31233, 31235-31236. Photochemical emissions are largely attributable to automobiles. 38 Fed. Reg. 7323. The Administrator determined that the only measure by which the ambient air quality standards might be satisfied by the mandatory compliance date was by reducing the supply of gasoline, and thus the number of automobile miles traveled in the affected regions. He therefore promulgated a Gasoline Limitation Regulation which provides that no later than May 31, 1977, he may "implement a program * * * limiting the total gallonage of gasoline delivered to retail outlets in [the regions] to that amount which, when combusted, will not result in the ambie. air quality standards being exceeded." 40 C.F.R. 52.241, 38 Fed. Reg. 31245.[4] According to current EPA estimates, even assuming that non-automobile hydrocarbon emissions are reduced by 50 percent by 1977, severe gasoline rationing still would be required in four of these five air quality control regions in order to satisfy the ambient air quality standard for photochemical oxidants (Pet. App. C, p. xxxv)

The State of California, various local government bodies, and petitioner in No. 75-1875 filed timely petitions to review the Gasoline Limitation Regulation in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. None of the parties attacked the Administrator's authority to limit gasoline sales in the exercise of his statutory responsibility to insure that state implementation plans include emissions limitations and transportation controls necessary to achieve the primary ambient air quality standards.

[4]The gasoline sales limitation regulation applies to the Metropolitan Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay Area, Sacramento Valley, San Joaquin Valley, and San Diego Intrastate Air Quality Control Regions.

Indeed, they conceded "that some form of rationing may ultimately be required * * * if the air quality standards are to be met" (Pet. App. A, p. x). Rather, they argued that the Administrator could not impose a regulation having as great a social and economic impact as the Gasoline Limitation Regulation, even if there were no alternative method for complying with the ambient air quality standards.

The court of appeals found that imposition of a limitation on gasoline sales in the affected areas was the only conceivable means for attaining the national photochemical oxidant air quality standard (Pet. App. A, pp. ix-xii). It therefore held that the Administrator's promulgation of this regulation had been neither arbitrary nor capricious (Pet. App. A, p. xii). It also rejected petitioner's constitutional objection based solely on the magnitude of the effect of this exercise of the federal government's plenary power under the Commerce Clause (Pet. App. A, p. xiii):

> The authority of Congress to regulate air pollution under the Clean Air Act pursuant to the commerce clause has previously been upheld in this case. * * *
>
> The authority to regulate pollution carries with it the power to do so in a manner reasonably calculated to reach that end. Since petitioners do not deny that gasoline reduction is rationally related to its stated purpose, they cannot argue that it is beyond the administrator's authority.

ARGUMENT

On October 12, 1976, John Quarles, Acting Administrator of the EPA, signed a "Revocation of Gasoline Rationing Regulations" (Appendix A, *infra*). That document, which became effective upon publication in the Federal Register (41 Fed. Reg. 45565, October 15, 1976), re-

vokes in its entirety 40 C.F.R. 52.241, the regulation at issue in this case. Consequently, the Gasoline Limitation Regulation no longer exists, and the action is moot. See, *e.g.*, *North Carolina* v. *Rice*, 404 U.S. 244; *Bus Employees* v. *Wisconsin Board*, 340 U.S. 416.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 75-1875 should be granted, the judgment of the court of appeals should be vacated, and the case should be remanded to that court to dismiss the petition for review as moot. The petition for a writ of certiorari in No. 75-1919 should be denied because it is untimely.

ROBERT H. BORK,
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PETER R. TAFT,
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OCTOBER 1976.

DOJ-1976-10

APPENDIX A

Title 40—Protection of Environment

CHAPTER I—ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

SUBCHAPTER C—AIR PROGRAMS

PART 52—APPROVAL AND PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

Revocation of Gasoline Rationing Regulations

Under the Clean Air Act as amended in 1970, State Implementation Plans (SIP's) were required to contain all regulations necessary to attain the health-related national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) no later than mid-1977. To the extent that State-developed SIP regulations are inadequate to insure such NAAQS attainment, the Act requires EPA to promulgate the necessary SIP regulations.

In 1973, EPA was required by Court orders to promulgate SIP regulations providing for timely attainment of the NAAQS for carbon monoxide and photochemical oxidants in certain areas of the United States. In response to these orders, EPA added to some SIP's a gasoline rationing regulation to take effect in 1977. This type of regulation was imposed only in those areas where EPA found that all reasonably available measures would not be adequate to attain the NAAQS by mid-1977.

At the time EPA promulgated the gasoline rationing regulations and several times since then, EPA has publicly stated that such regulations would produce extremely adverse social and economic consequences if implemented. Since EPA has had no desire to implement the regulations, EPA has since 1973 proposed and endorsed amendments to the Clean Air Act which would

authorize their revocation. Over the last several months, new Clean Air Act amendments which would have authorized such a revocation passed both Houses of Congress (H.R. 10498 and S. 3219). Such authorization was retained in the compromise amendments approved by the House and Senate Conferees. On October 1, however, Congress adjourned without completing action on the new Clean Air Act amendments.

Since it appears quite unlikely that Congress will enact new legislation before implementation of the gasoline rationing regulations is scheduled to begin (certain reports are to be filed by March 1977 and full implementation is to occur in May 1977), and since EPA has no intention of implementing the regulations, I believe that EPA should revoke them now.

I realize that this revocation will render the affected SIP's defective as a legal matter, since such SIP's will no longer contain regulations which provide for NAAQS attainment. I am convinced, however, that whatever benefits may be gained from keeping a technically legal SIP on the books by retaining the gasoline rationing regulations are outweighed by the seriously disruptive social and economic consequences of such regulations.

This revocation should not be construed as indicating that EPA will accept SIP's which do not insure attainment of the health-related NAAQS on grounds of cost. In fact, EPA is currently in the process of notifying many States that their presently-inadequate SIP's must soon be revised to include all achievable measures necessary to attain the NAAQS as expeditiously as practicable. Onerous, expensive, and/or "technology-forcing" requirements must be imposed wherever necessary. EPA's action today is thus a special case; it is being taken only because of the extraordinarily disruptive

nature of the gasoline rationing regulations and because both Houses of Congress have affirmatively expressed their desire that such regulations not be implemented.

This revocation is effective [date of Federal Register publication]. (Sections 110 and 301 of the Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857c-5, 1857g.)

/s/John Quarles

Acting Administrator

Dated: October 12, 1976

Part 52 of Chapter I, Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

Subpart F - California

§52.241 [Revoked]

1. Section 52.241 is revoked.

Subpart G - Colorado

§52.330 [Revoked]

2. Section 52.330 is revoked.

Subpart V - Maryland

§52.1110 [Revoked]

3. Section 52.1110 is revoked.

Subpart FF - New Jersey

§52.1592 [Revoked]

4. Section 52.1592 is revoked.

Subpart SS - Texas

§52.2293 [Revoked]

5. Section 52.2293 is revoked.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-3262

CITY OF SANTA ROSA, CITY OF PETALUMA, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND CHARTER CITIES, CITY OF CLOVERDALE, CITY OF HEALDSBURG, CITY OF SEBASTOPOL AND CITY OF SONOMA, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, PETITIONERS,

v.

RUSSELL E. TRAIN, ADMINISTRATOR AND UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENTS.

JUDGMENT

Upon Petition to Review an order of the Environmental Protection Agency .....

.....

This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of the Record from the Environmental Protection Agency

.....

..... and was duly submitted.

On Consideration Whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the Petition to Review the decision of the said Environmental Protection Agency in this Cause be and hereby is denied.

Filed and entered: March 29, 1976

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-3306

RONALD REAGAN, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; AND THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, PETITIONER,

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT.

JUDGMENT

Upon Petition to Review an order of the Environmental Protection Agency .....

.....

This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of the Record from the Environmental Protection Agency

.....

.....

..... and was duly submitted.

On Consideration Whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the Petition to Review the decision of the said Environmental Protection Agency in this Cause be and hereby is denied.

Filed and entered: March 29, 1976

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 73-3343

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, PETITIONER,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

JUDGMENT

Upon Petition to Review an order of the Environmental Protection Agency .....

This Cause came on to be heard on the Transcript of the Record from the Environmental Protection Agency

.....

.....

.....and was duly submitted.

On Consideration Whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the Petition to Review the decision of the Said Environmental Protection Agency in this Cause be, and hereby is denied.

Filed and entered: March 29, 1976

In the Supreme Court
OF THE
United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 75-1875

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, *Petitioner,*

vs.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, *Respondent.*

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF PETITIONER IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS

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Subject Index

Table of Authorities Cited

In the Supreme Court
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OCTOBER TERM, 1976

No. 75-1875

PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, *Petitioner,*

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On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF PETITIONER IN OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTION OF MOOTNESS

I

INTRODUCTION

Rather than respond on the merits to the petition for *certiorari* of Pacific Legal Foundation (hereinafter PLF), respondent Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA) revoked the gasoline limitation regulations at issue and immediately thereupon, suggested to this Court that PLF's petition (No. 75-1875) is now moot. (EPA Brief in Opposition in No. 75-1919 and Suggesting Mootness in No. 75-1875 at 6.) The Court has asked the parties to brief the question of mootness.

As this Court declared in *DeFunis v. Odegaard,* 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974):

> "The starting point for analysis is the familiar proposition that 'federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in this case before them.' North Carolina v Rice, 404 US 244, 246 (citation omitted) (1971). The inability of the federal judiciary 'to review moot cases derives from the requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or controversy.'" (Citations omitted.)

If a defendant, whose action has been challenged in court, voluntarily ceases that activity before final disposition of the case, the case does not automatically become moot. When the legality of the defendant's actions has been questioned, something still remains to be decided, *United States v. W. T. Grant Co.,* 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953), and when it appears that there is a danger of recurrence of the facts as they existed before the defendant ceased his activity, case law indicates that the merits of the case may be reached by the courts. "The question is 'whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.'"[1] *Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle,* 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974).

[1]The statutory mechanism for review of implementation plans (42 U.S.C. §1857h-5(b)(1)) appears to be a remedy in the nature of a declaratory relief.

In making this determination, the courts have traditionally examined the possibility of recurrence of the challenged action from two perspectives. *First,* can the defendant demonstrate "that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated"? *W. T. Grant, supra* at 633. *Second,* can it be shown that if the action is repeated, the impact will fall upon the same litigants? *State Highway Commission v. Volpe,* 479 F.2d 1099, 1106 (8th Cir. 1973). *See also,* Note, Mootness on Appeal, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1672, 1682-1685 (1970).

This brief undertakes to examine the application of these two questions to the situation existing in the present case.

II

EPA HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THE GASOLINE LIMITATION REGULATIONS WILL BE REISSUED

Case law has placed the burden of showing mootness with the defendant. "The case may nevertheless be moot if the defendant can demonstrate that 'there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.' [Footnote omitted.] The burden is a heavy one." *W. T. Grant, supra* at 633.

In *United States v. Phosphate Export Asso.,* 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968), this Court reiterated the principles stated in *W. T. Grant:*

> "The test for mootness in cases such as this is a stringent one. Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if

it did, the courts would be compelled to leave '[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.' [Citation omitted.] A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. But here we have only appellees' own statement that it would be uneconomical for them to engage in any further joint operations. Such a statement, standing alone, cannot suffice to satisfy the heavy burden of persuasion which we have held rests upon those in appellees' shoes. . . ."

In the present case, EPA has revoked the gasoline regulations on the basis that it has no desire to implement them because of their seriously disruptive nature and on the belief that Congress does not desire that they be implemented. EPA Brief, Appendix A at 7-9. Although the Administrator offers no assurances that similar regulations will not be reissued, his statement that EPA has no desire to implement the regulation may well be an assurance that it will not actively seek to renew this action.

The decision regarding such regulation is not solely under the Administrator's control. Until Congress does act, it is apparent from EPA's previous posture in this case that it has interpreted the Clean Air Act so as to allow it to issue the gasoline limitation regulations. The initial regulations promulgated by EPA for California were drawn up under court order. *See Riverside v. Ruckelshaus,* 4 E.R.C. 1729 (1972). Under these circumstances, without a definitive change in law, it is possible that EPA will again be put into

a position in which it feels it must reissue similar regulations.

The Administrator of EPA has asserted throughout this case that he has the authority under present law to issue the gasoline limitation regulations. Indeed, a major reason given for revoking the regulations is that the law the Administrator alleges gives him authority to make the regulations is expected eventually to be changed. EPA Brief, Appendix A at 8-9. If the present law is not changed, it appears that the Administrator will again consider himself free to reissue the regulations.

A new Congress and a new Administration have been elected. Whether the new Congress will act as the Administrator judged the old body desired to, or whether the new Administration will follow the same policy as the old, are questions incapable of determination at this time. These factors lend support to PLF's belief that questions regarding the validity of the gasoline limitation regulations remain very much alive.

III

EPA COULD REINSTATE THE GASOLINE LIMITATION REGULATIONS AT ANY TIME

In *Local No. 806, Oil Workers International Union v. Missouri,* 361 U.S. 363 (1960), plaintiff questioned the constitutionality of a state law which allowed the governor "to take possession of and operate a public utility affected by a work stoppage when in his opin-

ion 'the public interest, health and welfare are jeopardized' . . . ." *Id.* at 364. By the time the case came up for final decision, the strike and seizure which had prompted the lawsuit were over. This Court found the case moot.

The decision in *Oil Workers* is explained by this Court in *Super Tire, supra* at 122-123:

> "In both Harris [v. *Battle,* 348 U.S. 803 (1954)] and Oil Workers a state statute authorized the Governor to take immediate possession of a public utility in the event of a strike or work stoppage that interfered with the public interest. The seizure was not automatic for every public utility labor dispute. It took effect only upon the exercise of the Governor's discretion. In each case the Court held the controversy to be moot because both the seizure and the strike had terminated prior to the time the case reached this Court. The governmental action challenged was the authority to seize the public utility, and it was clear that a seizure would not recur except in circumstances where (a) there was another strike or stoppage, and (b) in the judgment of the Governor, the public interest required it. The question was thus posed in a situation where the threat of governmental action was two steps removed from reality. This made the recurrence of a seizure so remote and speculative that there was no tangible prejudice to the existing interests of the parties and, therefore, there was a 'want of a subject matter' on which any judgment of this Court could operate."

This Court, in *Super Tire,* distinguished the situation there presented and held that case not moot. In

Super Tire, the Court found that although the strike which had engendered the suit had ended, the controversy remained alive since the statute questioned would take effect immediately without the discretionary act of any official. *Id.* at 123.

The present case appears to lie somewhere between the extremes presented by *Oil Workers* and *Super Tire.* The immediate activity (regulation) which brought about this lawsuit has ceased. Unlike the *Oil Workers* situation, however, only one event need occur before the situation which began the lawsuit re-occurs—the action of EPA in reissuing the regulations. However, unlike *Super Tire,* a discretionary act of an official, again the reissuing of the regulation, is necessary before the facts are the same as they were before the cessation of the inciting activity.

The case at bar more closely resembles *Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri,* 374 U.S. 74 (1963), wherein plaintiffs again challenged the statute at issue in *Oil Workers.* In *Motor Coach Employees,* a strike was in progress, however, the governor had terminated his seizure of the public utility. This Court refused to find the case moot:

> "There . . . exists in the present case not merely the speculative possibility of invocation of the King-Thompson Act [which authorized seizure] in some future labor dispute, but the presence of an existing unresolved dispute which continues subject to all the provisions of the Act. Cf. Southern P. Terminal Co v Interstate Commerce Com. 219 US 498, 514-516 . . . United States v W. T. Grant Co. 345 US 629, 632 . . ." *Id.* at 78.

In the case at bar, the Clean Air Act remains unchanged by Congress. Defendant maintains that it has authority under the Act to issue gasoline limitation regulations, while plaintiff asserts it does not. This indicates "the presence of an existing unresolved dispute" as in *Motor Coach Employees. Id.* Further, in *Motor Coach Employees,* as in the present case, the challenged action involves the discretion of one government official which could at any time be exercised to return the parties to direct confrontation.

IV

IF THE GASOLINE REGULATIONS ARE REINSTATED THEIR IMPACT WILL FALL UPON PETITIONER

In cases in which a private defendant alleges mootness against a government plaintiff because of the cessation of the activity which has precipitated the lawsuit, the court generally presumes the same parties will again be affected if the activity recurs. This is true because the government is usually seeking enforcement of the law and is equally affected any time allegedly illegal conduct by a private defendant occurs. In suits against the government, however, it cannot be presumed that a private litigant will be affected if the activity which has ceased before a final disposition of the case is renewed. (*See* Note, Mootness on Appeal, *supra* at 1683.) Therefore, in cases of this nature, the lower federal courts have often stressed the need for assurance that the same parties will again be affected if the terminated action begins again.

State Highway Commission v. Volpe, supra; Alton & So. Ry. Co. v. International Ass'n of Mach. & A. W., 463 F.2d 872, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1972); *Committee to Free the Fort Dix 38 v. Collins,* 429 F.2d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 1970).

However, the views of this Court on the requirement for such assurances are somewhat uncertain. In several cases dealing with the mootness issue between private plaintiff and public defendant, this Court has tended to stress the need to question the likelihood of recurrence but has not required a separate and definitive showing that the same plaintiff will certainly be involved again.

In *Gray v. Sanders,* 372 U.S. 368 (1963), a voter sought an injunction and declaratory relief challenging certain Georgia statutes dealing with the method of counting votes in a Democratic primary for the nomination for United States Senator and other offices. Before the final resolution of the case, the Democratic Committee voted to hold the 1962 primary on a popular vote basis, rather than on the method challenged. This Court reasoned that this voluntary action did not moot the case.

> "Moreover, we think the case is not moot by reason of the fact that the Democratic Committee voted to hold the 1962 primary on a popular vote basis. But for the injunction issued below, the 1962 Act remains in force; and if the complaint were dismissed it would govern future elections. In addition, the voluntary abandonment of a practice does not relieve a court of adjudicating its legality, particularly where the practice is deeply

> rooted and long standing. For if the case were dismissed as moot appellants would be 'free to return to . . . [their] old ways.' United States v W. T. Grant Co. 345 US 629, 632, 97 L ed 1303, 1309, 73 S Ct 894." *Id.* at 375.

Although this action involved a private party versus the government, this Court did not mention the necessity for proof that the specific plaintiffs would be affected if the state action were again commenced.

A somewhat similar situation was presented in *Super Tire* wherein private plaintiffs challenged a state statute which allowed welfare benefits to striking workers. By the time the case was to be decided the strike involving plaintiffs had ceased and with it the challenged activity of welfare payments. This Court found that the case was not moot in that, among other things, the likelihood of government action continued since the statute remained in effect to be used if and when a new strike occurred. At no point did this Court mention the necessity that the private plaintiffs who were employers, show that in a new case they would be affected. Of course, in *Super Tire,* the existence of the challenged statute could influence workers in their collective bargaining negotiations. *Id.* at 124.

If this analysis is correct, it appears that this Court does not require a separate showing of certain effects on particular plaintiffs if the facts of the case make clear that plaintiffs will indeed be involved if the activity begins anew or if a residuum of government activity remains.

In *DeFunis v. Odegaard, supra,* another case in which a private party challenged government action, this Court, in dictum, plainly ignored the necessity that the private plaintiff show that the activity which had ceased would affect it if renewed.

> "There is a line of decisions in this Court standing for the proposition that the 'voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.' [Citations omitted.] *These decisions and the doctrine they reflect would be quite relevant if the question of mootness here had arisen by reason of a unilateral change in the admissions procedures of the Law School. For it was the admissions procedures that were the target of this litigation, and a voluntary cessation of the admissions practices complained of could make this case moot only if it could be said with assurance 'that "there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated."'* United States v W. T. Grant Co. supra, at 633 (citation omitted). Otherwise, '[t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways,' id., at 632 (citation omitted) and this fact would be enough to prevent mootness because of the 'public interest in having the legality of the practices settled.' Ibid. But mootness in the present case depends not at all upon a 'voluntary cessation' of the admissions practices that were the subject of this litigation. It depends, instead, upon the simple fact that DeFunis is now in the final quarter of the final year of his course of study, and the settled and unchallenged policy of the Law School to permit him to complete the term for which he is now enrolled." *Id.* at 318. (Emphasis added.)

This language, which was unnecessary for the decision, appears quite startling, since in *DeFunis,* it was obvious that the plaintiff would have been unable to show future affect if this had been a "voluntary cessation" case.

If the approach taken by this Court in *DeFunis, Super Tire* and *Gray v. Sanders* indicates a trend to abandon the requirement that private plaintiffs show to a certainty they will be affected by recurrent government action, PLF's discussion of mootness could be limited to a review of EPA's assertions of nonreissuance of the gasoline regulations. However, neither *DeFunis, Super Tire* nor *Gray v. Sanders* explicitly spoke to the "certainty of affect" requirement and the finding of not moot in *Super Tire* can be explained on numerous grounds. *Id.* at 122-127. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether or not, in the light of well established case law, petitioner will need to or be able to show its continued interest if EPA were to reissue the gasoline limitation regulations.

The necessity that private plaintiffs show a continuing interest in challenged government action has definitely been abandoned in a series of federal cases originating from this Court's decision in *Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,* 219 U.S. 498, 516 (1911). Therein the Court stressed the *public interest* in the case presented by the private party and allowed the case to go forward without requiring proof that the specific plaintiffs would be affected if the government reinstated the order about

which the plaintiffs complained. The *Southern Pacific Terminal* line of cases, however, which has stressed the public interest, rather than plaintiff's continued involvement in a case, has in large part been limited to situations in which the government action is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." *Id.* at 515. *See* Note, Mootness on Appeal, *supra* at 1685-1686.

The present case would fit within this standard if EPA were again to issue a gasoline rationing regulation scheduled to go into effect by May 1977. Even if a new time table is enacted by Congress, it is not unlikely that the resolution of a future challenge could be as long delayed as the present one.

Petitioner in the present case, however, is not a sole party representing only its own interests. Rather, it is a nonprofit corporation organized and existing under the laws of California for the purpose of engaging in litigation on behalf of California citizens in matters affecting the public interest. In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to represent the interests of its members, contributors and supporters who own or use vehicles which rely on gasoline. It is certain that these members, contributors and supporters will continue to be affected by any new actions on the part of defendant which seek to limit the gasoline supplies to California.

V

PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES A DECISION ON THE MERITS

A claim of public interest in the questions presented by the litigation will not alone save a case from a determination of mootness. *DeFunis, supra* at 316. However, "[w]hen the court views the public interest as greater a lesser possibility of repetition may suffice . . . ." *Alton & So. Ry. Co. v. International Ass'n of Mach. & A. W., supra* at 880.

There can be little question that litigation dealing with the Clean Air Act presents issues of immense public interest. The interests of the public in a definitive resolution of the validity of the gasoline limitation regulations should prompt this Court to rule on the merits of this case.

VI

CONCLUSION

In that respondent EPA has not carried its burden of proof that the revoked gasoline limitation regulations will not be reissued and petitioner PLF has demonstrated that a reissuance of such regulations will fall upon it and its members, PLF suggests that the criteria for mootness have not been met. Petitioner believes that the more appropriate disposition

would be to grant *certiorari* and summarily reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

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